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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

STATE OF IDAHO,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
TERRY RAY DALTON,
Defendant-Appellant.

NO. 45379
Ada County Case No.
CR-01-2017-17946

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF

Issue
Has Dalton failed to establish that the district court abused its discretion, either by
imposing a unified sentence of three years, with one and one-half years fixed, upon his guilty
plea to battery against a health care worker, or by denying his Rule 35 motion for a reduction of
sentence?

Dalton Has Failed To Establish That The District Court Abused Its Sentencing Discretion
Dalton pled guilty to battery against a health care worker and the district court imposed a
unified sentence of three years, with one and one-half years fixed. (R., pp.40-43.) Dalton filed a
notice of appeal timely from the judgment of conviction. (R., pp.44-46.) He also filed a timely
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Rule 35 motion for a reduction of sentence, which the district court denied. (R., pp.49-53, 5456.)
Dalton asserts that the district court abused its discretion by imposing an excessive
sentence in light of his substance abuse issues, desire for community-based treatment, acceptance
of responsibility, and Dalton’s claim that the district court’s sentencing decision “may have been
influenced by [then] current events.” (Appellant’s brief, pp.3-7.) Dalton has failed to establish
an abuse of discretion.
When evaluating whether a sentence is excessive, the court considers the entire length of
the sentence under an abuse of discretion standard. State v. McIntosh, 160 Idaho 1, 8, 368 P.3d
621, 628 (2016); State v. Stevens, 146 Idaho 139, 148, 191 P.3d 217, 226 (2008). It is presumed
that the fixed portion of the sentence will be the defendant's probable term of confinement. State
v. Oliver, 144 Idaho 722, 726, 170 P.3d 687, 391 (2007). Where a sentence is within statutory
limits, the appellant bears the burden of demonstrating that it is a clear abuse of discretion.
McIntosh, 160 Idaho at 8, 368 P.3d at 628 (citations omitted). To carry this burden the appellant
must show the sentence is excessive under any reasonable view of the facts. Id. A sentence is
reasonable if it appears necessary to accomplish the primary objective of protecting society and
to achieve any or all of the related goals of deterrence, rehabilitation, or retribution. Id. The
district court has the discretion to weigh those objectives and give them differing weights when
deciding upon the sentence. Id. at 9, 368 P.3d at 629; State v. Moore, 131 Idaho 814, 825, 965
P.2d 174, 185 (1998) (court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that the objectives of
punishment, deterrence and protection of society outweighed the need for rehabilitation). “In
deference to the trial judge, this Court will not substitute its view of a reasonable sentence where
reasonable minds might differ.” McIntosh, 160 Idaho at 8, 368 P.3d at 628 (quoting Stevens,
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146 Idaho at 148-49, 191 P.3d at 226-27). Furthermore, “[a] sentence fixed within the limits
prescribed by the statute will ordinarily not be considered an abuse of discretion by the trial
court.” Id. (quoting State v. Nice, 103 Idaho 89, 90, 645 P.2d 323, 324 (1982)).
The maximum prison sentence for battery against a health care worker is three years. I.C.
§ 18-915C. The district court imposed a unified sentence of three years, with one and one-half
years fixed, which falls within the statutory guidelines. (R., pp.40-43.) Dalton’s sentence is also
appropriate in light of his extensive criminal history and his failure to rehabilitate while in the
community.
Dalton’s criminal history demonstrates his disregard for the law, the terms of community
supervision, and the well-being of others. Dalton’s criminal record dates back to the 1980’s and
includes three prior felony convictions, over 25 misdemeanor convictions, and dozens of
additional charges. (PSI, pp.6-17.) Most of Dalton’s convictions are for alcohol related or
violent offenses. (PSI, pp.6-17.) He has been afforded multiple opportunities on probation, has
served jail time, and has been sentenced to prison for his crimes, but he has failed to rehabilitate
or be deterred by prior legal sanctions. (PSI, pp.6-17.)
Dalton’s assertions that the district court’s sentencing decision may have been influenced
by the events that occurred at a white supremacist rally at the University of Virginia the weekend
before Dalton was sentenced are unfounded. (See Appellant’s brief, pp.4-5.) Although the
district court noted it was “ironic” that Dalton – who outwardly expressed hatred toward the
health care worker he battered based on the health care worker’s race (see PSI, p.4) – was being
sentenced in close proximity to the racially-motivated events that had occurred “in the south”
(Tr., p.38, Ls.1-12), the court explicitly stated it was sentencing Dalton, not “for what is in his
heart,” but “for his actions” (Tr., p.38, Ls.12-17). As found by the district court those “actions
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[were] to get drunk again, and then lash out at the very people trying to help him.” (Tr., p.38,
Ls.16-17.) Also as found by the district court those actions are entirely, and unfortunately,
consistent with Dalton’s prior history: “The charge and charges that he has faced for these kinds
of actions goes on and on and on and on and on and on multiple felony convictions and a – it’s
just frankly too many to calculate the number of misdemeanors that he’s either been charged
with or convicted of for this kind of drunk and disorderly and violent conduct.” (Tr., p.38, L.21
– p.39, L.2.) Dalton’s purported remorse, acceptance of responsibility and desire for treatment
do not outweigh the seriousness of the offense or Dalton’s continued violent criminal offending.
At sentencing, the district court articulated the correct legal standards applicable to its
decision and also set forth its reasons for imposing Dalton’s sentence. (Tr., p.37, L.12 – p.40,
L.17.) The district court concluded,
Our healthcare workers in the ERs work hard hours trying to help people,
trying to save lives, and I think as was recognized by the victim in this case that
sometimes this is the price of their work, which is to be subject to being belittled,
to hatred and to violence, but it shouldn’t be. And that’s why the legislature has
deemed fit to make this crime a felony.
(Tr., p.39, Ls.17-24.) The state submits that Dalton has failed to establish that his sentence is
excessive for reasons more fully set forth in the attached excerpt of the sentencing hearing
transcript, which the state adopts as its argument on appeal. (Appendix A.)
Dalton next asserts that the district court abused its discretion by denying his Rule 35
motion for a reduction of sentence because he apologized to the victim and wants to get into a
treatment program sooner.

(Appellant’s brief, pp.8-9.)

If a sentence is within applicable

statutory limits, a motion for reduction of sentence under Rule 35 is a plea for leniency, and this
court reviews the denial of the motion for an abuse of discretion. State v. Huffman, 144 Idaho,
201, 203, 159 P.3d 838, 840 (2007). To prevail on appeal, Dalton must “show that the sentence
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is excessive in light of new or additional information subsequently provided to the district court
in support of the Rule 35 motion.” Id. Dalton has failed to satisfy his burden.
Dalton’s complaint that he wants to start his treatment program sooner and his reiteration
that he apologized to the victim is not new information that entitles him to a reduction of
sentence.

The district court was aware, at the time of sentencing, of Dalton’s desire to

participate in the River of Life treatment program. (R., pp.54-56.) The district court stated,
“While the Court applauds the Defendant’s acceptance in the program and his willingness to
address his chronic alcohol problem, this is not new or additional information which would
render his sentence excessive under ICR 35.” (R., p.55.) Dalton has not shown that he was
entitled to a reduction of sentence simply because he apologized to the victim and wanted to start
treatment sooner. Given any reasonable view of the facts, Dalton has failed to establish that the
district court abused its discretion by denying his Rule 35 motion for a reduction of sentence.

Conclusion
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm Dalton’s conviction and sentence and
the district court’s order denying Dalton’s Rule 35 motion for a reduction of sentence.

DATED this 31st day of January, 2018.

__/s/_Lori A. Fleming___________
LORI A. FLEMING
Deputy Attorney General

ALICIA HYMAS
Paralegal
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 31st day of January, 2018, served a true and
correct copy of the attached RESPONDENT’S BRIEF by emailing an electronic copy to:
ELIZABETH ANN ALLRED
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
at the following email address: briefs@sapd.state.id.us.

__/s/_Lori A. Fleming___________
LORI A. FLEMING
Deputy Attorney General
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APPENDIX A
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38

Vodka, I go on a binge, I don't know, I black out, I
2

4

It Is, I suppose, Ironic, nonetheless

don't even remember until I wake up in jail , And I'm

2

worth noting the defendant Is here to be sentenced today

tired of it. I truly am t ired of it, your Honor. I'm

3

for his actions that expressed a degree of hate and

4

malignancy of thought directed towards a person simply

ashamed of it.
I don't know what to say Mr. Hippler, I

5
6

truly need help and I wish you would give me this

s

because of the color of their skin, and I recognize

6

Mr. Dalton says that he doesn't remember doing this and
he does not think I way.

7

chance. I have -- this Is a great chance. The man

7

8

wrote me and gave me a chance. I really want to take

s

9

it. I can do this.

9

happened, unfortunately, this weekend where hate and
bigotry and that kind of thought resulted in terrorist

I say it's ironic, because of course what

10

THE COURT: Okay. Than k you.

10

11

THE DEFENDANT: Thank you.

11

action killing at least one person and injuring many

12

THE COURT:

12

ot hers in the south. But Mr. Dalton is not here for

Mr. Dalton, on your plea of guilty I

13

find you guilty. In an exercise of my discretion in

13

what is in his heart and only he knows what is in his

14

sentencing, I've considered the Toohill factors,

14

heart. I'm not here to sentence him for what is in his

15

including the nature of the offense and the character of

15

heart, I'm here to sentence him for his actions.

16

the offender, as well as the information in mitigation

16

17

and in aggravation. In determining an appropriate

17

then lash out at the very people trying to help him.

18

sentence, I'm mindful of the objectives of protecting

18

And I say "again" because he, as Indicated here, has a

19

society, achieving deterrence, the potential for

19

long history of drinking and then disorderly conduct

zo

rehabilitation and the need for retribution or

20

after drinking. He is a terrible drunk, he is a mean

21

punishment.

21

drunk, and he Is a v iolent drunk. The charge and

22

charges that he has faced for these kinds of actions
goes on and on and on and on and on and on multiple

n

I have reviewed and considered carefully

His actions are to get drunk again, and

23

the PSI materials, I've considered the arguments and

23

24

recommendations of counsel, and the statement the

24

felony convictions and a -- it's just frankly too many

25

defendant made today.

25

to calculate the number of misdemeanors that he's either

40
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been charged with or convicted of for this kind of drunk
2

3

regardless of what happens today, I hope that he seeks

and disorderly and violent conduct.

help. But I'm going to sentence the defendant to the

And the defendant stands before the court

3

custody of the Idaho State Board of Corrections under

4

today and asks for one more chance. I can't help but

4

t he Unified Sentencing Laws of t he State of Idaho for a

S

think he's asked for one more chance each t ime

s

term of three years. The court specifies a minimum

6

previously. That's not to say that in his heart he

6

period of confinement of one-and-a-half-years, fiKed

7

truly doesn't want one more chance and doesn't have

7

followed by a subsequent indeterminate period of
one-and-a-half years.

8

faith in himself that given one more chance that he

8

9

might be able to this time maintain sobriety. Maybe he

9

10

would be able to, I don't know, but what I do know by

10

11

his history is that it's not a very high likelihood.

12

13

14

THE DEFENDANT: I never had a chance, never had
a alcohol t reatment program, your Honor, I haven't.
THE COURT: The defendant's behavior and conduct

Frankly, I considered doing a three-years
fixed in this case because your history is t hat bad, but

11

I want you to have some incentive to get that treatment

12

t hat you're ta lking about. The program you asked to be

13

part of is a good program and I suspect they will be

14

there for you when you get out, but you need to

15

certainly should have caused him to seek treatment and

15

understand that that kind of conduct simply will not be

16

help, there's no doubt about t hat. These many times and

16

tolerated any longer and there is a price to be paid for
it.

17

these many places throughout the country. Ou r healthcare
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18

workers in the ERs work hard hours trying to help people,

18

So I'm going to impose that sentence, and

19

trying to save lives, and I think as was recognized by

19

I'm going to remand you to t he custody of the sheriff of

20

the victim in this case that sometimes this is the price

20

the county to be delivered to the proper agent of the

21

of their work, which is to be subject to being belittled,

21

state board of correction in eKecution of the sentence.

22

to hat red and to violence, but it shouldn't be. And

22

Any bail is exonerated. I'm going to order that you

23

that's why the legislature has deemed fit to make this

23

provide a DNA sample and right thumbprint impression.

24

crime a felony.

24

I'm going to order that you comply with the DNA Database

25

Act in that regard. I'll order that you pay court cost,

25

I know the defendant wants help and
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